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P R E F A C E
-0
ihz financial depression
prolific

in

of the

l ast

downfalls and embarassments

wiith the usually natural
into the hands

sequence,-

of receivers,

their

ten months,

of corporations,
being thrown

suggested to us

of Receiverships nf Corporations

so

the subject

for discussion.

VIe

are well aware of the broad field covered by such a
theme, but h.ve, from the whole mass of cases,on the subject,

attempted to point

to -s

miost important.

ject

to some of those ,hich seemed
Ue have considered first the su.b-

of receivers in general, and then proceeded to a

discussion of when and for what causes receivers have
been allowed to corporationsi
line

of the rights,

ceivers.

closing with a -eneral

powers and duties of corporate

outI

re-

I!

RECEIVERS

A receiver

is

GENERAL

a ministerial officer of a Court of
person between the

Chancery appointed as an indifferent
parties

to an action,

pendent

lite,

doe:; not

to take posession of and Ireserve

the fund ot propert,

seem equitable

that either

in

litigation,

when it

party should have

possession or control of it.
The

office

of Receivership

and the appointment

of

receivers have been assumed by courts of chancery for the
advnacement

of justice

of remedies

in

cellor

the courts

well said in

419,-"There

are

the court has
the justice

and are

founded on the

of law only.

Eainbridge

few cases that

not jurisdiction,

v.

The Lord Chan-

Laddeley,

3 LJac.

c.n be stated
where

inadequacy

it

is

in

- G.,

which

essential

to

of the ca:e to interfere by appointing a re-

ceiver".
In

exercising this

ted to it
"It

is

least,

wide

the court shodid proceed with great

a r eemptory measure
is

discretion -which is

to dispose

session before

a final

-Tlhose effect,

caution for

temporal at

of his property a defendant
judgment

or decree

permit-

is

in

pos-

reached by

the court determining the rights of the l arties.

to be exercised doubtingly but the court

therefore, not
must

be convinced that

And since

it

a

:iithout

citizen

is

ular hearing,
tion

it

interference

the verdict

wrong and

it

is

end.

with the right

of

of a jury and before a re,-

injury.

of property

it

needful and that

should only be granted for

of manifest

hearing,

is

of securing an appropriate

a serious

vests the owner
final

the relief

means

the aIpropriate

is

It is

the preven-

And because

it

di-

in his possession before a

recarded as a severe

remedy,

not to

be adopted save in a clear case and never unless plaintiff

would

rable

otherwise be

loss ."(Spelling

in

danger

on Private

of suffering

Corps.,

Vol.

2,

irrepaSec.840)

The remedy of receivership operates really as an eq"The

uitable execution.
nature,
in

not

itself

of an attachment,

no advantage

other claimants and
and rrofits

order of '-pointment
but a

is

in

e"st:'.aionit

the
gives

to the party applyring for

it

over

operates prospectively upon rents

which may come to the hands

of the receiver,

as a lien of those interested, according to their riggts
and priorities

in

or to the principal

,;ihich the rents and profits
this

summary jurisdiction

issue.
a court

subject
In

out of :ihih

the exercise

of equity reserves,

of
in

in a great measure, its ordinaty course of admimisterirvjustice; beginning at the end and levying upon the Iroperty of a kind of equitable
a general instead of a

execution by which it works

specific appropriation of the is-

sues and I-rofits, and afterward determining who is entitled to the benerit of the quasi-p' ocess.
as

But acting,

it often must of necessity, before the merits of the

cause have been fully developed, and not unfrequently
when the proper parties in interest are not all before
the court, it proceeds with much caution and circumspection in order to avoid disturbing unnecessarily or injujudicially legal rights and equitable

priorities."
2, S(c. 341.)
From the foregoing observations it is plain that

(Spelling on Private Corporations, VTo.

courts of Chancery have entrusted to them the greatest
disuretion in this matter ar

few absolute rules cold be

laid down to govern in cases involving the appointment
of receivers,

but

in Blondheim v. Loore, 11 Md., 394,

LeGrand, C. J., menti ns the following:1.

That the

power is a delicate one and to be exer

cised with great circumspection.
2.

That

it must appear that the claimant has a ti-

tle to the property and the court must be satisfied by
affidavit that a receiver is necessar., to preserve the

property.
3.

That there is

no case in

which the court appoinS

a receiver merely bec,,use measure can do ne

4.

That fraud or imminent damage,

,.n
...-

ii irimediate

0'

-

session shorld not be taken by the court must be clearly
proved.
5.

That unless the necessity be of the most strin-

gent character the court will not

:ppoint until the de-

fendant is first heard in response to the application.
As to the Appointment of Receivers for Corporations.
Our remarks so far hive been concerned with receivers

in cases between individuals but we feel that these

>

observations al;Ijly to cases of corporate receivers as
they applied to c:ses

of receivers of individuals long

before corporate receivers were of such every day occurrence as they now are.

It

ii but pertinent to ob---

serve here that a court of Chancery has innate in itself
power to appoint a receiver for the rents and profits :-s
such of a corporation, but the power to

appoint a receiv

er who shall bring about a dissolution of the corporation is primarily in the sovereign po.,;er (which power
created the corporation) but in imany cases and in most
we think, such power has been delegated to the chancery

tribun L: 3 by statute.
We may ncvw profitably

will

cussion of cases where receivers
This3,

corporations.

a troublesome subject.

is

however,

point a receiver and when they will

not resort to this

of securing right and preventing failure

means

of jus-

have never been expressed in form applicable

cases and for this
true knowledge
casea.
er

be allowed for

limits within whdch courts of equity will ap-

The exact

tice

to a dis-

turn our attention

reason we may perhaps

of the subject

And firstly,

as to the

on an ex parte application.

observe

that

pointment

a court

arrive at a

we consider
appointment
Of course

some actual
of a receiv-

it

is

fair

to

of chancery does not favor the ap-

of a receiver

to exercise

if

to all

on an ex parte apllication.

siuch surmuary power and dbprivea

ror"

corporation

of possession of its property without a chance to oppose
such a proceeding
Indeed,

in

ought not to be entered upon lightly
3 0 fowa
French v. GfIVrla.,
148, it was held that

such an allegation

as "that

be given to the defendant

if notice of this
the books recods

of said bank will be so falsified
they cannot ascertain
to justify

or spiritid

the said frauds"

the appointment

'f

was

application
and papers
away that
not sufficient

a receiver without notice

other

the

so th-3t

h,vho would oppose might have op-

parties

but

This case may be extreme

portunity so to do.

it

shows the delicate manner in which the courts consider
ex !arte applications.
us

And now let

consider the question of insolvency
obligations

and default

in

mortgage

appointment

,f

a receiver.

receiver na.y be apointed
but

solvent,

As a general proposition
when a corporation becomes

of the creditors

pointment
in

absence

in-

interests

or of the stock-holders require

:-ppointed.

If

he will be appointed,

the

p_1

However

otherwise not.

giving power to a court

of a statute

that a

require

such interests

has no power to act a s a

ty it

a

the controlling question with the court must

be whether the protection of the public or the

receiver be

a

for the

as a cause

of equi-

of insolvency for

coutt

the liquidation of the affairs of an insolvent corporaIt

tion.
to restrain
tcol their

has

over corporations

no peculiar jurisdiction

them in

the exercise

of their

powers or con-

&ctions or T'revent them from violating their

clorters, Then their is

no fraud or b-each of trust al-

leged as the foundation of a claim for equitable relief.
Thus

in

Pond v.

Farmingham & Sound R.

R.

Co.,

130 Mass

.,

194,

:here

the bill alleged that plaintiffs were credi-

tors of defendant
vent,

that all

coml:,any which it

its

property was mortgagyed

the benefit of one class

of creditors;

amounts to other crdditors,
its

property;

one

was

yr s stated

insol-

to trustees

that

fo-.

it owed large

of whom had attached all

ti'-.t it was about to execute a lease to sa

said attaching creditor for the term of 99 years at
rental yhich did not I:ay the interest upon its
ness; and that the executor of

a

indebted-

said le ase would be in-

jurious to the creditors and stockholders and prayed for
an injunction and receivers, the court held"In the absence of

any statute giving the power, this court has nrl

authority to act as a court of insol-ency for the liquidation of the affairs of an insolvent Rail Road Company."
But the appointment of a receiver is not a necessary sequence of the insolvency of

a corpora.tion, but

in al-

most all aases the application is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court unless a statute can be shown
regulating such appointments.
Line Co., 80 1. Y.,

In Deinke v. .7. (. & R.

599, the court/ay "Assuming that the

company was totally, insolvent,

so that

it could never re-

sume its corporate business the plaintiffs did not

in

any aspect of the case have an absolute ri::ht to a recThe

eiver.
it

court

was for the

property

interest

R.

that

R.

of all parties to , ermit the

to be sold under

and controlled by the
&C.

Co.,

conclude that

in its discretion mighl

the

judgments

or to be managed

an' in Pullan

executors."

4- Bliss, 50, the court says

v. C.

"I suppose

in no c;se of a mortgage ought a court of chancery

to op)oint a receiver if the mortgaged property is od
srch a value as to render
and sale

the

debt could all

it clear that

on a foreclosure

be made.

T1le appointment of a reciever does not follow as a
of a mortg ' 're against

matter of course the foreclosure
the corporation.

So it vas decided that a court of eq-

uity would not appoint
on its

of a rail

a receiver

merely being shown there

,;ras a

road company

default

in

payment

of interest secured by a mortgage of the properties and
income of the company,

when for

such default

tees under the mortgage vere entitled to
immediate

the trus-

immediate pos-

possession and had been

session,

had demanded

refused,

for

ultimate

loss would happen to the beneficiaries

the

court felt

that

it

must be shown that
under the

mortgage by permitting the property to remain in the

hands of the

owners until final decree and sale,

court saying, "We are
that

the

opinion, therefore,

not of the

a court of equity is nouxd in every such case on

failure

to pay to appoint a receiver without considering

other circtmustanees wlhich have a proper baaring on the
qvestion of appointment".
4 Dillon, 114).

( Union Truseo. v. R. R. Co.,

In such a case, indeed, to appoint a

receiver 7would amount

equity does not enforce penalties.

and leave

railroad

law.

executed by a railroad

Ett when a deed of trust,

its

fact we feel

,,arty to his remedy at

the

Company, mortgaged its

In

ttempts to relieve for

that a court of equity rather
penalties

of a penalty and

to the enforcement

income and profits, as well as

and other property

to secure

the payment

of

the principal and interest of its bonds, and authorized
the trustees,

in default

of the payment

of the

interest,

to take possession of the mortgaged property and apply
the income to the r. yment of the
in Allen v. Dallas & W. R. F.
my judgment,
nLent

independent

interest, Judge Woods,

Co., 3 Woods318,

said "In

of the necessity for the appoimt

of a receiver to protect

and preserve the trust

property it was the right of the bond-holders vnder the

terms of the trust deed, to have a receiver appointed to
take 1 ossession of the property".

In this case the

trustees had asked to have a receiver appointed.
In the c:.se of Warner v. Rising Fabirn Iron Co.,
report, the

same

trustees had refused to take possession and

it ,das held tit on the refusal of the trustees to take
, the conditions existing which
a receiver would be
authorized the trustees to take lossession appointed at
possession,

the suit

e

of the bond-holdet's.

So where a railroad company,

heavily mortgaged ,

had made several defaults in the payment of interest aggregating over $1 000 000,

its business was decreasing

with a probability of further decrease from competition
with new lines;

it

was in need of repairs

and improve-

ments; and the bond-holders were not in harmony and a
foreclosure

,%as about to be declared and no other way ex-

isted for applying the rents
its debts,
free
I

of the road to

and profits

the court daid, "Much as I should like to be

from the annoyance of a receivership it seems to me

should be delinquent

for a recdever.

if

I refused this

Brewer, J.,

in

appliaation"

ercantile Trust Co., v.

lvissouri & T. R. R., $6 Fed., 226.

And so where a rail-

road company with its well known obligations to the public has become entirel,r insolvent and unabTe to pi:

the

interest upon its secured debts, unable to pay its floating debt, unable to borr'ow money and in peril of breaking
up and the dtstructien of business likely, and confesses
this

inability and a bill is filed by a mortgage bond

holder for an injunction against attacks upon the mortgaged property,

and prays a receiveship to protect the

property of the corporation against peril, a temporary
receiver ray be appointed, although no default has taken
place on the securities owned by the plaintiff.
Brassey v

17.

Y. Cen

R. R. Co.,

(See

22 Blatchford, 72.) .

And also when the mortgaged property, consisting7 of
its

road and other propety,

the mortgaged debt,
propriating

its

is

in

adequate

and the company

earnings

is

security for t

insolv'nt and ap-

to its own use, a receiver will

be appointed during the pendency of a bill
filed
by the
mortgagee to be put in pnssess ion of the mortgaged prop-

erty.

The court saying "The views of this

court on the

subject of appointing receivrs of railroads are well
known.
right

It

will not appoint

a receiver

and necessity to do so are clear.

except where

the

On the facts of

c >se,

this

nearly

F.,

any case"

in

And again,

20 i'ed.,260).

(Dow v.

in

Iaas v.

that the court

law,

then to be undoubted

a re-

of that jurisdicMemphis &c.
P hicago

The

it

take

"We

the courtsa,,

504,

°9 ILL.,

Building Society,

to appoint

would seem to be

of the bill

as the exercise

imperative

tion can be said to be

R.

of the court

hearing

_intil final

ceiver
a3

the only duty

of Chancery may,

where the security is inadequate and a foreclosure proceeding

is

cumstances

pending

apT1oint

a receiver

if

f the mort-

of, frand or bad faith on the part

gagor, or other facts

are cir-

there

involved which would render a deBut

nial of the relief sought inequitable and unjust."
the court
mere

of chnczery

technical rights

holders
pears

(f

waill not in

appoint

a receiver where

that such action would imperil,
of others whose rights

ceive equal consideration.

In

which the court has

discretion

it

ing a receiver,
perceives

that

will

in

if
are

entitled

the exercise
in

it

ap-

not destroy,

the matter

to re-

of the broad
of appoint-

not make such apllointment

a much greater

interested

to the

of a ver-, small minority of bond

a corporation,

the interests

the se

mere deference

injury would result

if

it

to

the corporation than by leaving the

property
appears

in

the hands then holding it,

that the

bond-holders
(Lysen v.
appoint

especially when it

large majority of the stock-holders

favor

a fundinr- plan then being negotiated.

Vabash Co.,

a receiver

8 Bliss,

247).

where a mortgage

Nor ,'ill

a

upon income

the company unless

it

,Jas the result

business,

remain in

was shown affirmatively that
of some

and the fact

of the court.

court

and tolls

provided that the possesiion of a canal should

ault

and

is

other cause

def-

than failure

of

not shown to the satisfaction

(See Stewart

v.

Canal Co.,

4 Hughes,

47).

Though it might proue profitable to pursue these observations farther the brevity of this raper will not permit
such and we will now proceed to consider

a few of the

cases when a receiver has been appointed for misconduct
of

officers
The

or managers

officers and directors,

fiduciary relation
and

if

of the corporation.
of course, stand in a

to the stock-holders

the property

ger of bring lost

is

mismanaged

aril creditors,

by them and is

to the stock-holders

in

dan-

and creditors

through collusion and fraud of themselves,

the court may

properly appoint

of any one of

e receiver

on application

the stock-holders.
In

the Coal Co.

v.

Edwards,

103 Ill, 472,

a bill

was

fileu

a large

aleging that the corporaticn had contracted

indebtedness for sinking a shaft on trounds pur-

chased for that p urpose by the com,:any;
had Lecome wholly insolvent;

that the directors were fr

fraudulently mismanaging the affairs
tlat

that the company

of the corporation

the company had ceased to prosecute thD, work for

wihich it was

organized;

pany to attempt

that

it was useless fotr the com-

to resume business

on account of

nancial embarassment, and prayed for a receiver;

its fito which

the court says,--"On the face of the bill it would seem
to be a clear case for the appointment

of a receiver, a

necessary step under the facts stated, if true, to the
preservation of the property of the corporation for the
benefit of' creditors and stock-holders
That

part of the decree appointing a receiver will be per

mitted to stand."
P.,

interested in it.

2 ,oods,

And again in Forbes v. Memphis &c.

323, a receiver

P.

:ias allowed :,here the money

paid by the bond-holders for the bonds of a corporation
was,

with the assent and connivance of the directors, be-

ing squandered, wasted and embezzled by its officers and
agents instead

of being used for the rurpose to which it

was pledged, and thereby the bondholders as well as

the

bonafide

stockholders

in

were

of losing all

dnager

c-nd the corpora-

money by such frauds and embe7zlements,
tion was being rendered wholly insolvent
so

thereby.

on the same principle when the executive

of a company vote money to themselves,

in

company, or

of the members retittng

And

committee

addition to
7s promot-

their regylar compensation for their services
ers and originators of the

their

in consideration

from the executive

committee,

a

receiver will be appointed at the suit of the stockholders.

(Blatchford v. Ross, 34 Barb., 42).
However

ity

it

is

only in

are clearly violating

and

putting their

court

a strong case,

when the rndor-

the rights of the

interests

in

minority,

imminent danger that a

of equity will at the instance

of a ;iinorit;

of the

stock-holders,

in a copporation, interfere with the man-

agement

affairs

of' its

and appoint

a receiver,

and

in

such a case, a bill with mere general charges of fraud,
illegality

or mismanagement

is

mot sufficient

ize the aprlpointment

of a receiver

the case

Dexter,

of Hand v.

pretense th t
outside

the

41 Ga.,

to author-

by the court.
454,

Thus

there was no

corporation was undertaking anything

of its charter, but the burden of the complaint

in

was that the majority

of the stock-holders,

through the

officers, were managing the company fraudulently,for the

benefit

of the stockholders
by the fact that
officers

,20 000

but in

of' all,

the corporation
in

its stock,

ilr repudiated his agreement

of a portion

interest

was sought

this

and

the

not

to be n-,aintained

granted to one of its
subseqiient-

and the latter

and set up a claim of $20 000

expended by him for the corporation, which the latter con
sented to and surrendered to its treasurer 34 000 shares
of the stock, to be used by hi

to raise funds under the

direction of a committee to put the property in order and
But the court held thait this was not

pay the debts.

sufficient to take the property out of the lnds

of the

stock-holders and the arpointment of a receiver was denied, the court saying,of a corporation is

"The very foundation principle

that a i~mjority of its stock-holders

have a right to manage its affairs so long as they keep
within their chartered rights.
manage very fo, lishly,
very reckless

'They may,

they often do

make very bad contracts

things --------------

As

a court

and do
of equity

to carry on the business

of

will not appoint

receiver

mining, it follows

that thene can be no sufficient cause

for such a
:re

pursuinm

o urse so illegl

a

anrA ruinous

tes,

that

the "power

i:ay be called)

such it
or not

is,

in

statutory power as we

stated,
this

Uliilc
property

is

to the time
no act

he is

John

appointed,

entire

estate

referee

in

him relatsback

and from that moment

the 1<roperty either
9o in

26 Barb., 55,

the

case

by the

of In

where at 10 A.

be appointed

of the company and
a receiver

with the

yet when his appointment

crder,

that a receiver

to appoint

branch of our

possession of the

vested

its creditors.

.erry, Receiver,

of the rrop erty

so3nd

or be deemdd veste,

can be done affecting

order was trade

last

cannot take

of ,-rantin,- the

corporation or

the

powers and duties of a receiver.

of the corporation,

completedthe

namely,

also noticed.

the receiver

estate before

of a receiver

of course supplemented by

WJe shiall now Troceed with the
the rights,

(if

behind the tlirone"

the ay pointment

.,i'at wie at first

discretion of the court,

subject,

Th1. ;

these cases clearly

iere see what a confusion of all

demonst

'js to re-

of the co'.j any to be stop ed"

quire the affairs
we

st ock-holda rs

y of t lie

unless the maj orit

ill

it

to take

was referred

re

!I. an
chara
to a

and take from him the req-

uisite security,

and at three o'clock P.

a party recovered - Judgment against

T-. the same day

the coici:.ny under

which the :sheriff levied on the property of the coipany,
it wvts held that such levy b the s3heriff was invalid as
Havand subsequently the referee appointed a receiver,,
r
aainst
the r' ceivu j
ing been appointed receiver and entrusted with the power
incident thereto,
corelative
ing it

to take possession of the property,

duty is implied

on the part of every one hav-

in possession to deliver it

ing the property

to him,

in possession violates

sist ing the exercise of

a

and one hav-

the law in re-

that lawful authority of a re-

ceiver to take possession of the property and the receiver i-ay opl ose such resistance with all
comr and.

the means at his

'Ie may call on the sheriff and through him ! ay

have the power of the county to prevent

the courission

of a crime and thus enable him (the receiver)
the order (of his appointment).

(State v.

to execute

Rivers,

60 Ia,

653).
Having gotten possession of the property the receiver holds it,

and 1 ersons who nLay have liens on the prop-

erty which w-iere acquii'ed before the receiver was appointed have no right without apilic-tion to the court
pointing) to sell and dispose of the property.

(so apIndeed

the control

ly ,within

permission

its

to

the estate

in

Davis v.

ress
ual

'ray,

in

corporations

of certain
expressly

to sue in

-vhen

authority,

undoiibte

intended to be

results

t!-.n were

may not

authorizd

the court

and that

of equity,

the exercise

in

of

the best

accomplish all

secured by such !e7,islatioxi with-

aid.

The possession of the receiver
re-,ally not
prope-rty.
erty is

us-

they are

and aro

insolvent

t.-eir mn names,

sees mo reason 1,why a court

its

r~rorr-

charged with the duty of settling the affairs

by statute

out

rowers

of the states

dome

as

i-s beco'ie

it.

to clothe receivers wi"ih much larrer
that

holders

that with the

is

and 2rowth of equity jurisdiction

former ly conferred;

its

203,

16 Ufall.,

of the

of the decision

So the trernd

re quired by the charter.

l;ain

property

leave

an action ur -n

without the re qiiisite numer of share

court

under

_irs a sufficient

So he

Trosecute

tli.-t no one without

to meddle with it

permitted

court.

of

of contempt
in

is

of the court

so exclusive-

is

it

cets the property

the receiver

after

in
lie

in

himsely
is

ut

in

the officer

him as the,officer

policy of insurance

thnse

is

peculiar;

is

for whom lie holds the

of the T urt,
of

it

the court.

runs to a receiver,

in

and

the

Hence

Iropif

a desin.ated

a.

any charge
case

takes place in

sholnld become void "if

it

provided that

it

where

suit,

title

or possession

(except

of succession by reason of the death of the assured)

whethet by legal process

nr

judicial decree or voluntary
tiill not become void by

transfer or conveyance" it
change of rec-ivership.
136 U.

S.,

principle

287).
is

So it

that

is conceded that the 7general

a receiver

without

the previous

the property in his lands except such as
to the use
funds

in

of such property as getting

his ha:nds,

there

is

concerned except

the parties

direcout

of

iss essential

it

insured with

the qioestion as to whether

not he has exceeded his authority is
no one

a

(In Thompson v. Phoenix Co.,

tion of the court apr ointing him to incur expense

a question in

or

which

the court appointing him and

interested in the property within his charge

and himself.
This

in

(Thompson v. Phoenix Co.,

case also determines

of the funds

is

su bject

136 U. S.,

287).

that though the receivers
to the approval

use

of the court,

yet as the receiver is under such personal responsibilit.T
for the safety of the property

t:

rr.....
- 1

t
I....

ing would make a binding contract

such use
":as

of the
for

on the insurer.

funds
insur-

As

a general rroposition

receivershii
litigation,
'eneral

is

the r-ceiver

has not

-o,er incident to ?-is
However

authority to make contracts.
receiver

to exercise

the

its d4~cretion.

court

s'ich power but

such authorization contracts made by him

binding and the court may ratify
at

of a

object

tie -,reservation of the rroperty pending

may authorize the
without

the yrinmry

-re not

them or disaffirm them

Eut where a receiver

is appointed

under a code provision under decree of dissolution, the
statutory provisions mark the limits of the court's competency to confer powers upon the receivers od a dissolved corporation.

HLowever, when these statutory powers

are conferred by decree they involve and carry with them
such powersi ,js may be implied from the general object and
spirit of the statute, or as are
thority given expressly.
(as

incidental to the au-

.:o in the case of the Florence

Co. v. Tanby, 13 So., 347, where

of a corporation it appeared th t

on the dissolution

the dissolved company

had contracted to erect an electric plant for defendant
and

had n-early completed the -iotkwhen it was dissolved

and no part of the agreed price had been paid, it was
held the complainant as receiver had power to compiete

2 6

the work and defendant's

to complete

and his offer

contract,

the

the work under

had the

refusal,

effect as

same

if the company had not been dissolved and had itself made
the
is

of the corporation,

trustee

successor

of the corporation,

but he has no int-erest

or

except

as

third persons he represents
and stock-holders

which the

against Leavitt,

rights of

controversies

with

of the creditors

no rights

corporation could not

15 N.

Y.,

9,

itself

he succeeds

to the

-:

under

them, where

ctherwise v-iid have been made

in fraud of

creditors and takes titie

conveyances

the trust

in New York according to the case of Cur-

represent, but
tis

in

In

conferred by the statute.

the receiv,'r

holding the property as

power over the prnperty embraced
is

noticed,

And as we have before

offer.

their rights, and in such c-ses he hclds adversely to the
cirporation.
As to the Standing of

a receiver

in

ession of corporate proretty the c -se of
Mutual Life Ins. Co.
teresting.

Ilere

v.

regard to posjIn re Atlantiv

16 Ala., Law Jour., 453,

the Attorney General

is

in-

had gotten a re-

ceiver apponted who was in the discharge of his trust
when a decr4e

of bankrubtcy was given against the

compa-

ny.

The receiver moved that the decree

against the

of b)nkrptc,,'

company be set aside and the court, through

Wallace, J., held thi,,t the receiver had sufficient standing in the court to make the motion and such motion w -s
granted on his a)pplicaticn.
given

In 1Iew J-)rsey a receiver

is

such standing that he may not set up as a defence

in a suit for injuriesfor the negligent running of trains
on a rail road operated by him.

A statute that requires

that such actions be brought ;iithin two years, the court
in this case saying,-

"The receiver, within the sphere

his instructions represents

of

the company by virtue of

such a relationship he exercises all its necessary franchises and

in my opinion he is

its agent appointed not by

the corporate body itself but by the law for certain end.:
of his own.

Looking at the subject

in the light

of pliblic policy there seems to be no propriety in giving a longer life to a right of -action arising during a
receivership

than is

-iven to one arising wh le the

road

is in the hands of the directors, for if the investigation in the latter case should not be unreasonably delayed, neither should there be procrastination in the formet
(See Bartlett v. Kein, 50 _H. J. Law, 260,).

These cases

would seem to prove that the receiver is practicaly

the

corporat irx

is

and it

itself,

is

anu thing that the receiver

out of the assets

the most possible
Hence he

is

bound to do

it

is

to make

of the corporation.

allowed to do anything that the c arporat ion

could do or have done to make the assetts
possible.

there

if

wouild seem that

lurrin, 83

In Jacobs v.

e,? under a deed of trust

as

large as

Ill., 424, the trust-

to secure the payment

of a s.un

due an insurance company over which a receiver had been
appointed ,.as directed to se&l the premises described in
the trust

deed in

accordance with its

sale Jacobs bid $2
capacity bid $10

terms.

At the

938 and the receiver, in his officaal

070.

The trustee struck off the

land

to the receiver and it was held that the sale was valid;
the court saying,-

"The right to so bid rff property in

satisfaction of a debt would belong to the power of' the
receiver to collect

the debts of the cmnkpany.

wo ld be necessary and,

in

the exercise

The act

of such power

in

order to make the most of property held as security for a
debt and prevent

its

ceiver

do anything in

iight

not

sacrifice,

we do not see why the rethis

respect

company could have done to make the most

that

the

of' its assetts".

broader

in a

the receiver of an insolvent corporation is

At times

losition

poratirn;

than a mere relresentative

of the cor-

representing both the corporation and credi-

tors, and when ne stands as such dual representative

he

may and even must do many things which he cou!d not do
if he were
In

the representative of the corporation merely.

Pittsburgh

0

arbon Co.,

v.

) cllillan,

119 1.

Y.,

46, the

there was a controversy over a fund arising through an
unlawful combination over which the receiver
The court,

ed.

on rage 52,

say,-

"It

is

,.[as appointd

claimed theft

no action could have been maintained by the trustee, representing the trust

combination against

the E. & L. Co.

to recover the purchase Irice of the carbons for the reason that the

illegality of the combinti(n would have

constituted a good defense.

Assuming this predicate,it

is

stands

asserted that the receiver

tion,

and that his title

tr'as

that of the

is

in

the saae

subject to the same

it

is

infirmi-

combinati-ons which he represents.

out considering the assumptmin on which his
is ]_ased,

posi-

'ith-

-roposition

a sufficient answer to the proposition

asserted, that the receiver unites

in himself the right

of the trust combinatinn, and also the right

of the

cred-

itors, and that he may assert
tive

a claim as the representa-

of' the creditors, wi ich he mirht be unable to assert
7en-

The

as a representative of the combizirrtion x:erely.

eral ri-le is well established tliut a receiver ta~kes the
title

of the corporation (,r

he is,

and that

against

any defence

individu2l whose receiver
.hich

the former m y be asserted

Fut there

would h Yve been good
a;ainst

the

latter.

is a recognized excep,tion, % ich permits a re-

ceiver of an insolvent

individual or corToration, in the,

interest of creditors, to disaffirm dealings of the debtor in

fraud

of their

rights.

Assuming

could not have recovered of the

B. & L.

that the trustee
Co.

for the rea-

sons suggested, it would be a verystrange arrlication of
the doctrine, that no right

of action can spring from an

illegal transaction, which should deny to the
creditors of the

innocent

combination or to the receiver who rep-

resents them the right to have the debt collected and applied in satisfaction of their claim".

But, as was

at the beginning, the receiver is an "indifferent

said

person"

hence he is not permitted to advocate the cause of one
claimant
ferent,

against

another;

between them he must

be

indif-

owing a like duty to all, and for that reason

should,

as far as possible,

oIrportunit:
the
give

put

to enforce his cldm.

r,'presentative

of all

them reasonable

good faith

see to it

and adopt

e

is

the creditors

but equal aid.
all

the claim nf each creditor
the Inriod of distributinn.

tified

in

in

in

this

and

in

ration with a
Matter

to

to act

prudent measures

in
to u

the way of liquidation

interposing any unconscientdons

reasonable haste

bound

Hence he is

the liquidation of arVr demand,

an

respect

!He ought

proper and

before

(See

that each has

or in

not

obstacles

justo

pressing with un-

the collection of a claim due the

corpo-

view; of excluding an offset by a creditor.

of Van Allen,

230).

67 Earb.,

the receiver has power to compel the restoration
allproperty

unlawfully

previous

-,nd in

even though the title

corporation
his

abstracted from the corpor ation

to his appointment

held that

is

of

not vested in

some states

it

to the property
the receiver,

is
of the

he may sue

in

own name to recover possession, and even maintain an

action for conversion if possession can not be restored.
Thus

in

pany in

Terry v.

Bramberzer,

Connecticut

York goods

had

in

14 Llatchford,

the hands

234,

a com-

of one Castle

of New

on sale on commission on which Castle had a

lien as security for

liability on acceptances for

the

Connecttclitcompany.

Castle assigned to Ramberger under

the New York Laws.

'arnberger

took possession with notice

that the goods belonged to the Connecticut

corporation.

Terry being appointed receiver of the corporation, tenwho

dered the acceptances

to Eambergerm refused to deliver

them and sold them.

Terry as receiver now sued him;

court hold,-

"The

plaintiff

the

as receiver had a right to

institute suit in this state against the defendant for a
conversion happening prior to the irlaintiff's
The receiver

-

is

the agent of

appointment

the law to collect

property of the corpor-tin and to wind up its affairs,
and for that purpose to do all acts which -ay be nesecsary in the execution of the trust.
he acts
prop,-ty

Ey authority of law

in the rlace oft he directors but no title to
is

changed

-..--

whether the receiver or the

corporation is plaintiff the action is for the recovery
of the value of property the title
company.

in the

EIeing thus the agent by the law to wind up the

affairs of the corporation,
do in

of which is

this behalf,

within the state,

and to do whatever it

the receiver

is

coiild

authorized to collect

its debts and choses

in

action of what-

ever nature the same may be and to conmnence any proper
suits, whether sounding in tort or in contract".

This

case was, of course, decided under the Connecticut statutes
2o the receiver has the power, ,,ie think, to compel
the payment
tors.

If

ofi unpaid subscriptions

the capital stock of a corporat ion is

fund then it

is

the duty and legal

stock-holders to pay it
that

it

where

on behalf offcredi-

in

a trust

6bli7ation of the

according to their agreement

may be applied to the payment

of debts.

So

a court of' equity has conferred power upon the re-

ceiver to sue for,
session all

collect,

receive and take

into pos-

the goods rights and credits of the corpora-

tion, and the showing is that a share-holder is debtor
to the corporation to theamount ofhis share, or subscription to the capital stock,
corporation,

such debt is

a credit of the

and therefore the receiver has full

power

and authority, not only to receive and collect

it,

to sue

idorrison

in his own name for the same.

Receivers etc.,

58 Md.,

Brown,

333,

77 Ill.,

42.).

(Frank v.

but

T1i'e case of Chandler v.

does not lay down a doctrine opposed

to the above as some writers would seem to contend, but
holds that in order to maintain
ceiver must show that

such an action the re-

the stock-holdeI sued was made a

party to the proceeding in wlhich the receiver was appoint
ed.

incident to the power of the receiver to col

So as

the receiver has the

lect unpaid stock s-bscriptions,

to make calls upon the stock-holders

er to

for balance

of c-lrital remaining unpaid to satisI'y creditors,
such subscriptions

may call in
at

In

on ce.

and he

from time to tjne or all

making such assessments the receiver

should have the sanction of the
er,

1 ou

Actually,

® urt.

the receiver irakes the assessment,

howev-

the court passing

upon the question of whether facts exist which render the
assessments necessary and proper.
careful the court is
without

that the receiver do not proceed

its sanction we cite the case

32 led.,
if

As an example of how

of Glenn v.

.'iocon,

where an order contained these words,-

7,

"And

there shall be any sum unpaid and due upon the shares

of' the capital stock of said company the said receiver
will proceed to collect and recover the sa-ae,

unless the

persons of' whom the said sums may be due shall be wholly
insolvent,
etc.,

an!

snd for this t-urpose may prosecute action".
it

was held that the authority

conferred was merely to bring suit
should levy an assessment,
did

intended to be

in case the court

and that the order of itself

not amount to a call for which prescription wouIld

begin to run.

Some

courts

fo even Ifurther

ler v. Keith, 42 Ia.,

as

in

the

case

of Chand-

99, where the terms of a subscrip-

tion Lo a joint stock company proscribed that after 20
percent had been paid, the balance

should be "subject to

the call of the directors, as they may be
the majorit:Y of the stock-holders,"
ing become

instructed by

and the cmpany hav-

insolvent, a receiver was appointed, who in-

stituted an action against a stock-holder for the remaining 80 percent of his stock subscription, and the court
held that

the receiver had no authority to call upon the

stock-holders
the amount
the

liability

for payment until the

of indebtedness
of' each share

court had determined

of the corroration and fixed
of the stock,

and that this

fact should be averred in the petition of .the receiver to
enforce the payment

of the 80 percent.

This

is a ver-,

strict decision, but we cannot but feel, in the light
the great power that a receiver does possess, that the
court was right

and eminently justified in arriving at

the conclusion above set forth.
I

oi"

In
derive
there

tile foregoing
original

have,

prnet-nded

of Corportins,

same as a"disctission"

o

matters and case-

as we stated

in

the be.,inning,

to loint to some of the principal

ceivorships
the

not

,,ie hiave

conclusions from tl'e

discussed but

attempted

remarks

cases on Re-

and we respectfully submit
or perh ls

Ithaca,

moro properly

New York;
April,

1894.

a di-
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